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STATEMENT OF APPELLATE COURT JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal under Utah Code §78A-4103(2)G).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
In deciding this appeal, the Court need address only the following issues:
Issue 1: To be valid and enforceable, a restrictive employment covenant must,
among other things, be "carefully drawn to protect only legitimate interests of the
employer." Robbins v. Finlay, 645 P.2d 623, 627-28 (Utah 1982); Allen v. Rose Park
Pharmacy, 237 P.2d 823, 826 (Utah 1951). Did the district court err in granting
Robinson's motion for summary judgment and ruling that S&A's Restrictive Covenants
were invalid and unenforceable when S&A tacitly conceded their Restrictive Covenants
failed to satisfy the necessary legal requirements?
l(j

Standard of Review: A district court's grant of summary judgment is reviewed for
correctness. Truck Ins. Exchange v. Rutherford, 2017 UT 25, ,IS, 395 P.3d 143.
Issue 2: Although S&A tacitly conceded that their Restrictive Covenants were
facially unreasonable and unenforceable, they argued the district court could employ its
equitable powers to blue pencil or reform the Restrictive Covenants to render them
reasonable and enforceable. After reviewing the undisputed facts and applicable law, the
district court declined to invoke its equitable powers to relieve S&A from the
consequences of their own overreaching. Was the district court's refusal to employ its
equitable powers to blue pencil or reform the impermissibly overbroad Restrictive
Covenants an abuse of discretion?

1 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Standard of Review: Although the ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment
is a legal question reviewed for correctness, the district court's conclusion will be granted
some deference when the ultimate underlying issue rests in the district court's equitable
discretion. See Lindsey v. Lindsey, 2017 UT App 38, 'if'if24-30, 392 P.3d 968; Withers v.
Jepsen, 2011 UT App 8, 'if'if2, 5-6, 246 P.3d 1215. And while a court may in certain

instances exercise its discretionary equitable powers to reform a contract, those
"equitable powers are narrowly bounded." Briggs v. Liddell, 699 P .2d 770, 772 (Utah
1985).
Issue 3: Under Utah's bad-faith litigation statute, Utah Code §78B-5-825(1), a
prevailing party's reasonable attorney's fees must be awarded if the district court
determines that the action "was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith."
S&A filed this action seeking a judgment declaring that all of their Restrictive Covenants
"were and are valid and fully enforceable" against Robinson. (R. 0013.) S&A maintained
this position throughout the litigation. But when faced with summary judgment, S&A
reversed course, tacitly acknowledging that their Restrictive Covenants were facially
invalid and unenforceable. Because S&A tacitly confessed that their Restrictive
Covenants were invalid and unenforceable, but did so only after nearly two years of
litigation, was the district court's ruling that S&A's action was without merit and not
brought or asserted in good faith a reversible error?
Standard of Review: Whether a prevailing party is entitled to an award of his
reasonable attorney's fees under Utah Code §78B-5-825(1) is a mixed question of law
and fact. Gallegos v. Lloyd, 2008 UT App 40, if6, 178 P.3d 922. Whether the action was
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without merit presents a question of law reviewed for correctness. In re Discipline of

Sonnenreich, 2004 UT 3, if45, 86 P.3d 712. Whether the action was not brought or
asserted in good faith presents a question of fact reviewed under a clearly erroneous
standard. Id.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

NATURE OF THE CASE.
This appeal arises from Plaintiffs/Appellants Vivint Solar, Inc. 's ("Solar") and

ARM Security, Inc.'s ("ARM" and, collectively with Solar, "S&A") attempt to enforce
certain non-compete and non-solicitation provisions (the "Restrictive Covenants") against
Defendant/Appellee Douglas Robinson ("Robinson"). Even though Robinson never
worked for Solar, and had never worked in the solar industry, the Restrictive Covenants
sought to bar him from working in the solar industry-and several other unrelated
industries-anywhere in the United States and other locations throughout the world. The
Restrictive Covenants also sought to prevent Robinson from soliciting any of the tens of
thousands of current and former employees, representatives, and consultants of not only
S&A, but also of a multitude of other companies, including The Blackstone Group, LP, a

$330 billion investment firm with scores of separate portfolio companies.
When S&A filed this action, their Complaint demanded a judgment declaring
these Restrictive Covenants valid and fully enforceable against Robinson. S&A
maintained this position throughout discovery. But when faced with having to defend
their Restrictive Covenants at summary judgment, S&A could not. They instead
abandoned the stance they had maintained for nearly two years and quietly conceded for
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the first time that their Restrictive Covenants were facially unreasonable and
unenforceable. Notwithstanding their eleventh-hour confession, S&A argued that all was
not lost because the district court could simply employ its equitable powers to blue pencil
or reform the facially invalid Restrictive Covenants to render them reasonable and
enforceable. The district court properly declined S&A' s invitation and granted summary
judgment.

II.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISTRICT COURT'S DISPOSITION.
S&A terminated Robinson without cause on August 6, 2014. (R. 0602-03.) Forty-

eight hours later, they sued him on August 8, 2014, for allegedly violating the Restrictive
Covenants. (R. 0001-19.) After completing discovery, which had been extended on three
occasions at the request of S&A, Robinson moved for summary judgment on February
12, 2016. (R. 0326-85.) S&A opposed summary judgment on March 22, 2016. (R. 10521121.) Robinson filed his reply in support of summary judgment April 11, 2016, and the
district court heard oral argument on Robinson's summary judgment motion on April 21,
2016. (R. 1235-1316, 1451-1575.) The district court entered its Ruling and Order
granting summary judgment on May 5, 2016. (R. 1419-40.)
Robinson subsequently filed a motion requesting payment of his reasonable
attorney's fees under Utah Code §78B-5-825(1) on May 19, 2016. (R. 1441-50.) S&A
opposed the motion on June 16, 2016. (R. 1637-68.) Robinson filed his reply
memorandum, and the district court heard oral argument on Robinson's attorney fee
motion on September 20, 2016. (R. 1697-1716, 1750-1851.) After the hearing on
Robinson's motion for attorney fees, the district court entered its Order Granting
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Defendant Douglas Robinson's Motion for Award of Attorney Fees (the "Order
Awarding Attorney Fees"), finding that S&A' s action against Robinson was without
merit and not brought or asserted in good faith. (R. 1880-92.)
As directed by the district court, Robinson submitted a declaration establishing the
legal fees he incurred in this action on October 20, 2016. (R. 1852-68.) S&A opposed
Robinson's requested fees, and on January 30, 2017, the district court held an evidentiary
hearing on the propriety and reasonableness of Robinson's requested fees. (R. 2536-93.)
After considering all the evidence presented, the district court awarded Robinson's
requested fees. On March 14, 2017, the district court entered its Order and Final
Judgment. (R. 2612-14.) S&A filed their notice of appeal on March 24, 2017. (R. 24762519.)
RELEVANT FACTS

Robinson's statement of facts is limited to only those undisputed facts that are
relevant to the issues before the Court on appeal, i.e., the enforceability of the Restrictive
Covenants, and the propriety of Robinson's attorney fee award.

I.

THE PARTIES.

1.

Doug Robinson has worked in the direct sales industry since 2003. Over the

years, Robinson has provided services for several different companies and has
successfully built and managed numerous large sales teams. (R. 0387-88.)
2.

ARM is a wholly-owned subsidiary ofVivint, Inc. ("Vivint"), which

provides home security and home automation products and services to residential
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customers. (R. 0476, 1056.) ARM does not manufacture, market, or sell any of its own
products or services, but rather acts solely as a marketing arm for Vivint, Inc. (Id.)
3.

Solar is a publicly traded company that sells, installs, and services

residential solar-power generating systems. (Id.)
4.

Solar's business is limited solely to the sale, installation, and servicing of

residential solar-power generating systems. (R. 0540-41.)

5.

During the time period relevant to this action, Solar operated in only certain

locations within seven states. (R. 0501, 0535-39.)

II.

VIVINT RECRUITS AND HIRES ROBINSON AS A REGIONAL
MANAGER.
6.

In October 2012, Robinson was working as a regional manager for one of

Vivint's competitors when he was approached by certain Vivint executives and recruited
to join Vivint as a regional manager. (R. 0388.)
7.

After several weeks of negotiations, Robinson agreed to join Vivint, and

entered into a Vivint Regional Manager Employment Agreement and Vivint Side Letter
to Regional Manager Employment Agreement on or about November 3, 2012. (R. 038889.)
8.

As he had done throughout his tenure in the direct sales industry, Robinson

successfully built and managed a sales region for Vivint/ARM, which was comprised of
approximately 100 to 300 sales representatives. (R. 0390.)

Ill.

ROBINSON'S RELATIONSHIP WITH SOLAR.

9.

Robinson was never employed by Solar. (R. 0392.)
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@

10.

Robinson never sold a solar-generating power system for Solar. (Id.)

11.

Robinson never interacted with any of Solar' s customers. (Id.)

12.

Robinson never managed a Solar sales team, and never trained any of

Solar's sales representatives regarding Solar's products or services. (Id.)
13.

Rather, Robinson's relationship with Solar was merely one in which he

could recruit individuals to work for Solar, and in return, Solar would (at least
theoretically) pay Robinson certain stock-option like compensation based on the number
of sales made by his recruits under Solar's Long Term Incentive Pool (the "LTIP Plan").

(R. 0391-94.)
14.

To receive his promised recruiting incentive compensation, Robinson

signed the V. Solar Holdings, Inc. 2013 Long-Term Incentive Pool Plan for Recruiting
Regional Managers Notice of Award and Award Agreement (the "Award Agreement")
on or about October 13, 2013, which contained certain restrictive covenant provisions in
its appendix. (R. 0393, 0510-16.)
15.

After signing his Award Agreement, and based on the promised LTIP

compensation, Robinson recruited approximately 79 individuals to work for Solar. (R.
0397-98.)
16.

Several months after Robinson had signed his Award Agreement and

recruited individuals to Solar, he was told that Solar was unilaterally amending the L TIP
Plan, which was not allowed under the Plan's terms, and that the changes would
significantly reduce the L TIP compensation that Robinson was promised and that he
relied on in signing the Award Agreement and recruiting for Solar. (R. 0393-96.)

7 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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17.

When Robinson expressed his frustration that Solar was changing the terms

of the deal that Robinson had relied on, Solar simply responded that it could change the
Plan at its discretion, and that it decided to amend the Plan because the original one that
Robinson was promised was never approved by Solar's executives. (Id.)
IV.

ROBINSON REFUSES TO CONSENT TO CHANGES TO HIS LTIP
COMPENSATION AND IS FIRED WITHOUT NOTICE OR CAUSE.
18.

When Robinson continued to complain about the fact that his LTIP

compensation was being improperly and unfairly reduced, and started informing his
superiors that he was looking at other employment options, he was fired. (Id.)
19.

Specifically, on August 6, 2014, approximately only one week after

Robinson refused to consent to the amended LTIP compensation, ARM's General
Counsel presented Robinson with a written letter terminating Robinson's relationship
with Vivint, ARM, and Solar without cause. (R. 0396, 0602-03.)
20.

Robinson's termination letter identified several documents that Vivint,

ARM, and Solar claimed still bound Robinson: the Regional Manager Agreement; the
Side Letter Agreement; the Award Agreement; and an ARM Sales Representative
Agreement. (R. 0602-03.)
21.

Robinson had never before seen the ARM Sales Representative Agreement

that was provided with his termination letter. And despite the fact that the ARM Sales
Rep Agreement had Robinson's name typed in the signature box, Robinson does not
recall ever typing his name on these documents, but speculates that he must have

8
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unknowingly checked an online box when he was completing the online forms to access
Vivint's regional manager databases. (R. 0396-97.)
22.

Although there was a dispute over whether the ARM Sales Representative

Agreement applied to Robinson, it was undisputed that Vivint/ARM never demanded or
even requested that Robinson sign this agreement. In fact, the parties never even
discussed the ARM Sales Representative Agreement. (Id.) More importantly, the parties
never operated under its terms, many of which were directly contradictory to Robinson's
position as a regional manager. (R. 0397.)
23.

Rather, it was undisputed that Robinson and Vivint/ARM operated under

the terms of Robinson's Vivint Regional Manager Agreement. (Id.)
24.

When S&A fired Robinson on August 6, Solar had not provided him with

any LTIP compensation or awarded him any LTIP Credits despite the fact that he was
responsible for recruiting approximately 79 representatives to Solar who sold well over
500 solar-generating power systems for Solar. (R. 0397-98.)
25.

Furthermore, although Robinson was terminated with approximately only

three weeks remaining in ARM's 2014 sales season, Vivint and ARM did not pay
Robinson any override commissions for the thousands of sales made by the
representatives in his region. (R. 0398.)

V.

S&A SUE ROBINSON TWO DAYS AFTER FIRING HIM.
26.

On August 8, 2014, less than 48 hours after firing Robinson, S&A filed this

lawsuit accusing Robinson of violating the Restrictive Covenants. (R. 0001-19.)
Gi;)
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A.

The Solar Restrictive Covenants.

27.

The Solar Award Agreement includes an Appendix A, which consists of

approximately five pages of restrictive covenants that Solar attempts to foist on Robinson
and other LTIP participants (collectively, the "Solar Restrictive Covenants"). (R. 051016.)
28.

The Solar Restrictive Covenants include, among others, the following non-

compete and non-solicitation provisions:
(a)

The Participant acknowledges and recognizes the highly competitive
nature of the business of the Company and its Affiliates and
accordingly agrees as follows:
(i)

During the Participant's Services with the Company or its
Affiliates or Subsidiaries (the "Employment Term") and for a
period of one year following the date the Participant ceases to
be employed by the Company or its Affiliates of Subsidiaries,
or any such longer period as may be agreed to between the
Participant and the Company or any Affiliate (the "Restricted
Period"), the Participant will not, whether on the Participant's
own behalf or on behalf of or in conjunction with any person,
firm, partnership, joint venture, association, corporation or
other business organization, entity or enterprise whatsoever
(for the purposes of this Appendix A, a "Person"), directly or
indirectly solicit or assist in soliciting the business of any
then-current or prospective client or customer of any member
of the Restricted Group in competition with the Restricted
Group in the Business.

(ii)

During the Restricted Period, the Participant will not directly
or indirectly:
(A)

engage in the Business anywhere in the Untied States,
or in any geographical area that is within 100 miles of
any geographical area where the Restricted Group
engages in the Business, including for the avoidance of
doubt, by entering into the employment of or rending
(sic) any services to a Core Competitor, except where

10
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such employment or services do not relate m any
manner to the Business;

* * *
(iv)

During the Employment Term and the Restricted Period, the
Participant will not, whether on the Participant's own behalf
or on behalf of or in conjunction with any Person, directly or
indirectly:
(A)

solicit or encourage any employee of the Restricted
Group to leave the employment of the Restricted
Group;

(B)

hire any executive-level employee, key personnel, or
manager-level employee (i.e., any operations manager
or district sales manager) who was employed by the
Restricted Group as of the date of the Participant's
termination of employment with the Company or who
left employment of the Restricted Group coincident
with, or within one year prior to or after, the
termination of the Participant's employment with the
Company; or

(C)

encourage any consultant of the Restricted Group to
cease working with the Restricted Group.

(R. 0511-12.)
29.

Appendix A to the Award Agreement defines the restrictive covenant terms

"Restricted Group," "Business," and "Core Competitor" as follows:
(A)

"Restricted Group" shall mean, collectively, the Company and its
subsidiaries and, to the extent engaged in the Business, their
respective Affiliates (including the Blackstone Group L.P. and its
Affiliates).

(B)

"Business" shall mean (1) origination, installation, or monitoring
services related to residential or commercial security, life-safety,
energy management or home automation services, (2) installation or
servicing of residential or commercial solar panels or sale of
electricity generated by solar panels, (3) design, engineering or
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manufacturing of technology or products related to residential or
commercial security, life safety, energy management or home
automation services and/or (4) provision of television, wireless voice
and/or data services, including internet, through a common internet
connectivity pipeline into the home.
(C)

"Core Competitor" shall mean ADT Security Services/Tyco
Integrated Security, Security Networks, LLC, Protection 1, Inc.,
Protect America, Inc., Stanley Security Solutions, Inc., Vector
Security, Inc., Solmins, Inc. Monitronics International, Inc., Life
Alert, Comcast Corporation, Time Warner, Inc., AT&T Inc.,
Verizon Communications, Inc., DISH Network Corp., DIRECTV,
Pinnacle, JAB Wireless, Inc. Clearwire Corporation, CenturyLink,
Inc., Cox Communication, Inc. and any of their respective Affiliates
and current or future dealers, and Sungevity, Inc., RPS, Sunrun Inc.,
Solar City Corporation, Clean Power Finance, SunPower
Corporation, Corbin Solar Solutions LLC, Galkos Construction, Inc.,
Zing Solar, Terrawatt, Inc., and any of their respective Affiliates or
current or future dealers.

(R. 0512.)

B.

The ARM Restrictive Covenant.

30.

The ARM Sales Representative Agreement contains the following non-

solicitation provision (the "ARM Restrictive Covenant"), which provides in relevant part:
NON-SOLICITATION: In the event of termination of this Agreement or
Representative's employment with ARM, and for a period of five (5) years
from the date of such termination, Representative will not directly or
indirectly engage in the following conduct, nor will Representative aid,
abet, assist, encourage, or influence others to do so: Induce or attempt to
induce, solicit or attempt to solicit, or encourage or attempt to encourage, in
any capacity, on Representative's behalf or on behalf of any other firm,
person, or entity . . . any current or former representative, employee, or
contractor of ARM, Vivint, Inc., or any parent, subsidiary, agent, dealer,
affiliate, assignee, or assignor of said entities to terminate their relationship
with that entity or work for an entity that competes with ARM, Vivint, Inc.
or any parent, subsidiary, agent, dealer, affiliate, assignee, or assignor of
said entities.
(R. 0610.)
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

I.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.
The district court properly entered summary judgment dismissing S&A's claims

against Robinson because it correctly determined that the Restrictive Covenants
underlying S&A's claims were invalid and unenforceable under Utah law. In granting
summary judgment, the district court properly applied the legal standard governing the
enforceability of Restrictive Covenants set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in System

Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 425-26 (Utah 1983), including the requirements
that restrictive covenants must be necessary to protect a business's goodwill and
reasonable in its restrictions as to time and area. As the district court recognized, S&A
were unable to show that their Restrictive Covenants satisfied these requirements-and,
indeed, S&A did not even attempt to do so.
The district court also properly rejected S&A's request to blue-pencil or reform
the facially overbroad Restrictive Covenants because Utah courts have never permitted
the application of so-called "blue pencil principles" and have consistently refused to
reform or rewrite parties' contracts to impose an agreement different than the one signed
by the parties. And even if the equitable remedies of reformation or blue-penciling were
available to S&A, the district court was well within its discretion to refuse to award such
relief under the circumstances here. This Court should therefore affirm the district court's
grant of summary judgment.
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II.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY AWARDED ROBINSON
ATTORNEY FEES UNDER THE BAD FAITH STATUTE.
The district court properly awarded Robinson's attorney fees under Utah's bad

faith statute, Utah Code §78B-5-825, because S&A's action was without merit and not
brought or asserted in good faith. The district court correctly determined based on the
undisputed facts that S&A's claims-based entirely on their Restrictive Covenantswere without merit because S&A lacked a basis in law and fact to assert them. The
district court also acted within its discretion when it found that S&A brought and asserted
their claims in bad faith under each of the factors set forth in Cady v. Johnson, 671 P .2d
149 (Utah 1983). This Court should therefore affirm the district court's award of
Robinson's attorney fees.
ARGUMENT

I.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT
DISMISSING S&A'S CLAIMS.
A.

Summary Judgment Was Warranted Because S&A's Restrictive
Covenants Are Admittedly Unreasonable And Unenforceable As
Drafted.

S&A recognize that to be valid and enforceable their Restrictive Covenants must
be: (1) supported by consideration; (2) negotiated in good faith; (3) necessary to protect
the trade secrets or goodwill of the business; and (4) reasonable in its restrictions as to
time and area. Allen v. Rose Park Pharmacy, 237 P.2d 823, 826 (Utah 1951); System
Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421,425 (Utah 1983). (Appl. Br., p. 11.) Because S&A
sought an injunction against Robinson they were also required to prove that Robinson's
services were special, unique, or extraordinary. Robbins v. Finlay, 645 P.2d 623, 627-28
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(Utah 1982). Although they pay lip service to these requirements, S&A have never
attempted to show that their Restrictive Covenants satisfy all the necessary
requirements-not at the district court and not in their appeal to this Court.
To the contrary, S&A tacitly concede that their Restrictive Covenants are facially
invalid because they are impermissibly overbroad and impose restraints on Robinson far
greater than reasonably necessary to protect any legitimate interest that S&A may have.
Because S&A's Restrictive Covenants admittedly fail to satisfy the applicable legal
standards, they are invalid and unenforceable as a matter of law-and summary judgment
was properly entered.
1.

The Solar Restrictive Covenants are admittedly facially
unreasonable and unenforceable.

Solar's business is limited to selling, installing, and servicing residential solarpower generating systems in seven states. (R. 0501, 0535-41, 1056.) It is also undisputed
that Robinson was never employed by Solar; never sold a single solar-power generating
system for Solar; never interacted with Solar's customers; never trained Solar's
employees on its products or services; and never managed any of Solar's sales teams. (R.
0392.) Instead, Robinson's relationship with Solar was simply one where he could recruit
individuals to work for Solar and, in return, Solar would pay him (at least theoretically)
certain incentive compensation under the LTIP Plan. (R. 0392-94.) Despite these
undisputed facts, Solar attempted to bind Robinson to restrictive covenants preventing
him from competing against Solar-and scores of other unidentified companies-in
industries where Solar did not compete and in locations where Solar did not operate.
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Specifically, Solar's non-compete barred Robinson from engaging in any
"Business anywhere in the United States, or any geographical area that is within 100
miles of any geographical area where the Restricted Group engages in the Business ... "
Solar defined "Business" to include not only residential and commercial solar, but also
unrelated industries such as the "origination, installation, or monitoring services related
to residential or commercial security, life-safety, energy management or home
automation services," and "the provision of television, wireless voice and/or data
services, including internet, through a common internet connectivity pipeline into the
home." (R. 0511-12.) The "Restricted Group" encompassed not only Solar, but also its
subsidiaries and affiliates, including The Blackstone Group L.P. ("Blackstone") and its
affiliates engaged in the Business. (Id.)
And Solar's non-compete restrictions did not end there: they also barred Robinson
from working for Solar's supposed "Core Competitors"-a list of more than thirty
companies, including such well-known companies as AT&T Inc., Time Warner, Inc.,
Comcast Corporation, DIRECTV, DISH Network Corp., and ADT Security Servicesnone of which engage in the solar industry. And while Solar labeled these companies its
"Core Competitors," Solar confessed that most were not even competitors, let alone core
competitors. (R. 0543-48.) In fact, Solar's Vice President of Operations and 30(b)(6)
designee testified that he had never even heard of several of the supposed "Core
Competitors." (Id.)
Solar' s non-solicitation provision fares no better; it purports to prohibit Robinson
from soliciting, encouraging, and in some instances hiring, individuals who did not
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work-and indeed never worked-for Solar. (R. 0511-12.) Solar's non-solicitation
provision also barred Robinson from soliciting any employee or consultant of the
Restricted Group and from even hiring the Restricted Group's undefined "key
employees." (Id.)
Although Solar maintained from the filing of the Complaint and throughout
discovery that its restrictive covenants were valid and fully enforceable, Solar abandoned
that fa9ade at summary judgment, refusing to even try to defend its restrictive covenants.
(R. 1052-1121.) Instead, Solar tacitly conceded for the first time what it knew all alongthat its restrictive covenants were impermissibly overbroad and imposed restraints far
greater than were reasonably necessary. Solar could not articulate any scenario in which
its restrictive covenants could be construed as facially valid. And when asked to identify
the legitimate interests being protected by barring Robinson from working in industries
where Solar did not compete, Solar confessed that it had none. (R. 0593-94.)
Solar's inability to defend or justify its restrictive covenants is not surprising,
because, as the district court observed, "they are indefensible." (R. 1436.) Solar
admittedly has no legitimate interest in preventing competition in unrelated industries or
in geographic locations where it did not operate. Still, Solar sought to bar Robinson from
competing in 4 3 states where it had never operated and from working in several
industries-and for numerous companies-unrelated to Solar's business. Solar's attempt
to wall off not only itself, but also members of the "Restricted Group," from competition
in various industries anywhere in the United States and untold locations across the globe
is unreasonable as a matter of law. See System Concepts, 669 P.2d at 426 (a restrictive
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covenant is enforceable only if, among other requirements, its geographical restrictions
are reasonable). 1
It is undisputed that Solar never identified the Restricted Group's "key

employees" or even provided Robinson with a list of the specific entities that comprised
the Restricted Group-apparently because Solar could not identify the covered entities.
When Robinson issued interrogatories asking Solar to identify Blackstone's affiliates,
Solar objected claiming the request was "vague, ambiguous and susceptible to multiple
meanings, and that the information sought in this request is potentially overbroad, not
proportional, and calls for one or more legal conclusions." (R. 0645.) Solar further
admitted during its 30(b)(6) deposition that it could not identify Blackstone's Affiliates
included in the Restricted Group. (R. 0595.)
Solar' s inability to identify all of the entities comprising the Restricted Group is
also not surprising considering that Blackstone is one of the world's largest investment
companies, with over $330 billion in assets under management and scores of portfolio

1

As they did before the district court below, S&A misleadingly quote a portion of the
System Concepts opinion to argue that their Restrictive Covenants can be enforced
notwithstanding their indefensible geographic reach. Solar relies on the following quote
from System Concepts: "[w]hile some courts have held that an omission of the space
requirement will render a covenant void, we are of the opinion that such a harsh penalty
is not warranted." (Appl. Br., p. 19.) While S&A's quotation of the System Concepts case
leads the reader to believe that it provided a complete quote of the Utah Supreme Court's
statement, S&A actually omit important language that puts the court's statement in
context. The court's full statement was that "[w]hile some courts have held that an
omission of the space requirement will render a covenant void, we are of the opinion that
such a harsh penalty is not warranted under the particular circumstances of this case."
System Concepts, 669 P.2d at 427 (emphasis added). System Concepts did not hold, as
S&A suggest, that Utah courts will save an otherwise overbroad restrictive covenant by
crafting a judicially imposed geographic limitation.
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companies. (R. 0654-58.) But while not surprising, Solar's inability proves that its
restrictive covenants stretch well beyond any legitimate interest and impermissibly
prevent fair competition. Moreover, Solar' s attempt to prevent Robinson from soliciting
the "Restricted Group's" employees or consultants regardless of whether Robinson ever
worked with them, or even knew of their existence, and from even hiring certain of the
Restricted Group's undefined "key personnel," is unreasonably overbroad as a matter of
law. And again, Solar has never attempted to claim otherwise.

2.

The ARM Restrictive Covenant is admittedly facially
unreasonable and unenforceable.

Like Solar's restrictive covenants, ARM's non-solicitation provision is equally
indefensible. ARM's non-solicitation provision, which is buried on page six of its 45page boilerplate direct seller agreement, prevents Robinson for a period offive years from
inducing, soliciting, or encouraging any current or former representative, employee, or
contractor of ARM and a legion of other unidentified entities to terminate the relationship
or to work for any competitor. (R. 0610.) ARM also never attempted to defend the scope
of its non-solicitation provision-not at the district court and not on appeal-because it is
indisputably indefensible.
ARM' s non-solicitation provision prohibits Robinson for a period of five years
from soliciting not only the thousands of current ARM representatives, but also the tensof-thousands offormer employees, representatives, or contractors of ARM regardless of
how long ago the individual worked for ARM. And these restrictions apply regardless of
whether Robinson ever interacted with these individuals. Even more shocking, these
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restrictions covered not only ARM's current and former employees, representatives, and
contractors, but also the current and former employees, representatives, and contractors
of ARM' s "parents, subsidiaries, agents, dealers, affiliates, assignees, and assignors." (R.
0610.)
ARM was well aware of the vast scope of its restrictions and testified that
Robinson would violate ARM's non-solicitation provision ifhe attempted to solicit,
induce, or encourage any former ARM representative to work for a competitor regardless
of how long ago the former representative's relationship with ARM ended. (R. 0473-75.)
Under ARM's non-solicitation provision, Robinson would breach its restrictions if today
(201 7) he solicited, or even encouraged, an individual who had not worked for ARM
since 2007 to work for an ARM competitor-notwithstanding that the individual had not
worked for ARM in over a decade or that Robinson had not worked with ARM in over
three years. (Id.) The above example would also apply to any ARM "parent, subsidiary,
agent, dealer, affiliate, assignee, or assignor." (R. 0610.)
ARM conceded at summary judgment that it has no legitimate interest in imposing
such broad restrictions. The only purpose served by such a provision is to improperly
restrict competition, which ARM may not do. Robbins, 645 P.2d, at 627 (restrictive
covenants that "are primarily designed to limit competition or restrain the right to engage
in a common calling are not enforceable.") That ARM's non-solicitation provision is
indisputably overbroad is further illustrated by the fact that when Robinson served
interrogatories asking ARM to identity its "parents, subsidiaries, agents, dealers,
affiliates, assignees, or assignors," ARM objected complaining "that the terms 'agents,'
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'dealers,' 'affiliates,' and 'assignors' as used in this interrogatory are vague, ambiguous
and susceptible to multiple meaning, and that the information sought in this request is
potentially overbroad, not proportional, and calls for one or more legal conclusions." (R.
0647.) But if ARM cannot identify the entities covered by its non-solicitation prov.ision,
it is unreasonable as a matter of law for ARM to enforce such vague and overbroad
restrictions against Robinson.
Finally, prohibiting ARM's former representatives, like Robinson, from soliciting
current or former representatives of ARM and the legion of other covered entities for a
period of five years is unduly restrictive and unnecessary to protect any legitimate
interest as a matter of law. ARM, like Solar, is also "affiliated" with Blackstone a multibillion dollar investment firm that owns scores of portfolio companies in diverse
businesses such as SeaWorld Parks and Entertainment; Croes, a designer of casual
footwear; and Emdeon, a healthcare IT company. (R. 0654-58.) ARM does not operate
theme parks, design footwear, or operate a healthcare IT company-ARM sells Vivint's
home security and automation products door-to-door. The ARM non-solicitation
provision, however, prohibits Robinson from so much as encouraging any employee,
representative, or consultant who works for any of Blackstone's many portfolio
companies from seeking employment elsewhere. And this restriction applies regardless of
whether Robinson ever worked with the individual or was even aware that the individual
worked for a Blackstone portfolio company.
Considering the gratuitous over breadth and overreaching of their Restrictive
Covenants, it is not surprising that S&A never attempted to justify or defend the validity
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of their Restrictive Covenants at summary judgment. But S&A's concession that their
Restrictive Covenants failed to comply with the long-established requirements set forth
by the Utah Supreme Court in Allen, Robbins, and System Concepts doomed their claims
against Robinson at summary judgment-and now dooms their appeal.

3.

The district court did not strictly construe the Restrictive
Covenants.

The district court did not strictly construe the Restrictive Covenants. Rather, it
correctly articulated the necessary legal requirements under Allen, Robbins, and System
Concepts and then applied those requirements to the plain language of the Restrictive
Covenants. (R. 1425-37.) In fact, the district court did not have occasion or need to
construe the Restrictive Covenants at all because S&A tacitly acknowledged they were
invalid as drafted. S&A's failure to suggest a reasonable construction, or even an
ambiguity, demonstrates that no construction by the district court-strict, liberal, or
otherwise-would have avoided summary judgment. S&A's reliance on Fort Pierce
Industrial Park Phases II, III & IV Owners Association v. Shakespeare, 2016 UT 28, ,Il9,
379 P.3d 1218, is misplaced because that case involved restrictive covenants affecting the
use of real property; it had nothing to do with post-employment restrictive covenants. The
fact that the district court did not alter its summary judgment ruling after considering Fort
Pierce further demonstrates that the district court did not strictly construe the Restrictive
Covenants. (R. 1821-22.) And, in any event, an employment agreement drafted by an
employer containing restrictive covenants is strictly construed against the employer. See
Microbiological Research Corp. v. Muna, 625 P.2d 690,694 (Utah 1981).
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B.

The District Court Did Not Err By Refusing To Blue Pencil Or
Reform The Restrictive Covenants.

Having conceded that their Restrictive Covenants are facially unreasonable and
unenforceable, S&A's appeal rests on their claim that the district court committed
reversible error by failing to blue pencil or reform the Restrictive Covenants to render
them reasonable and enforceable. This argument fails for a host of reasons. First, the
district court correctly dete~ined that Utah law, which governs both S&A's claims,
"does not prescribe the use of a judicial blue pencil to reform outrageously overbroad
restrictive covenants." Second, the district court correctly determined that blue-pencil and
reformation principles were not available based on the undisputed facts. Finally, even if
S&A had established a proper basis permitting the use of blue-pencil or reformation
principles, they have failed to demonstrate-or even argue-that the district court's
refusal to employ such equitable remedies here was an abuse of discretion.

1.

The district court correctly determined that Utah law
governed S&A's claims.

On appeal, Solar argues that Delaware law governs its claims because the LTIP
Plan contains a Delaware choice-of-law provision that applies to the Restrictive
Covenants even though they are contained in the separate Award Agreement. 2 (Appl. Br.,
pp. 16-17.) The Court should reject Solar' s argument out of hand because it was not
properly preserved. "To properly preserve an issue for appellate review ... the issue must

2

That Utah law governs ARM's claims is undisputed. ARM and Robinson are both
citizens and residents of Utah, their relationship and interactions occurred primarily in
Utah, and the ARM non-solicitation provision is contained in an agreement with a Utah
choice-of-law provision. (R. 0611.)
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be specifically raised, in a timely manner, and must be supported by evidence and
relevant legal authority." Donjuan v. McDermott, 2011 UT 72,120,266 P.3d 839. Solar
failed to comply with these requirements, presenting its Delaware choice-of-law
argument to the district court in a few conclusory and unsupported sentences in its
summary judgment opposition brief. (R. 1100.).
Even if Solar had properly preserved its choice-of-law argument, the district court
correctly rejected it. From the filing of its Complaint, Solar alleged that Utah law governs

all claims in the lawsuit. (R. 0002.) It was not until summary judgment that Solar first
suggested Delaware law should apply. But the Solar Restrictive Covenants are not
contained in the L TIP Plan-they are contained in Robinson's Award Agreement, which
does not have a choice-of-law provision. (R. 0510-16.) And Solar's attempt to bootstrap
the choice-of-law provision into Robinson's Award Agreement contradicts the LTIP
Plan's plain language.
The LTIP Plan's choice-of-law provision states that "[t]he Plan shall be governed
by and construed in accordance with the internal law of the state of Delaware ... " (R.
0526, 17(f) (emphasis added).) The LTIP Plan defines "Plan" to refer only to the LTIP
Plan itself. "Award Agreement" is separately defined and refers to award agreements
such as Robinson's Award Agreement. (R. 0518, 0530.) The LTIP Plan's choice-of-law
provision has no reference to the law governing an Award Agreement. Because the plain
language of the choice-of-law provision applies only to "the Plan" and not to an "Award
Agreement," Delaware law does not govern Robinson's Award Agreement or the
restrictive covenants contained therein.
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Courts determine the meaning of a contract "by looking first to the plain language
within the four comers of the document," Peterson & Simpson v. lHC Health Services,

Inc., 2009 UT 54,113, 217 P.3d 716, and "will not rewrite a contract to supply terms
which the parties omitted," Hal Taylor Assoc. v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 749
(Utah 1982). Where a specific term is included in certain provisions of a contract, but
excluded from others, the exclusion is deemed intentional under the maxim inclusion

unius est exclusio alterius, i.e., the inclusion of one term is the exclusion of another.
Kansas City Southern v. Grupo TMM, S.A., 2003 WL 22659332, *3 (Del. Ch. Nov. 4,
2003); Active Asset Recovery, Inc. v. Real Estate Asset Recovery Services, Inc., 1999 WL
743479, *11 (Del. Ch. Sept. 10, 1999); see also lnnerlight, Inc. v. Matrix Group, LLC,
2009 UT 31, 115, 214 P.3d 854, 857-58.
Solar points to the definition of the term "Restrictive Covenant Breach" in the
LTIP Plan, which is also referenced in the Award Agreement, to conclude that the Award
Agreement is governed by Delaware law. Solar's conclusion does not follow. It is
immaterial that the Award Agreement refers to a term in the L TIP Plan. What matters is

iJ

the actual language of the LTIP Plan's choice-of-law provision, which expressly provides
that only the L TIP Plan is governed by Delaware law and which is not incorporated by
reference in the Award Agreement.
Solar also argues that the LTIP Plan and Robinson's Award Agreement were
"executed substantially contemporaneously and are clearly interrelated" and should thus
be harmonized and construed as a whole, including by applying Delaware law to the

i

Award Agreement. (Appl. Br., p. 17.) Not so. As the district court correctly noted, neither
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Robinson nor Solar executed the LTIP Plan-it was unilaterally adopted by Solar. (R.
1421.) And Solar adopted the LTIP Plan in July 2013-approximately three months
before Robinson received his Award Agreement in October 2013. (R. 0510, 0527.)
Solar also fails to establish why the district court was required to harmonize the
two documents by importing the L TIP Plan's choice-of-law provision into the Award
Agreement, when Solar-which drafted both documents-chose not to include a choiceof-law provision in the Award Agreement. See Innerlight, Inc., 2009 UT, at ifl5. There is
no difficulty applying the express terms of both the LTIP Plan and the Award Agreement
as drafted-the L TIP Plan is governed by Delaware law, and the Award Agreement is
governed by Utah law because it is silent as to choice of law and Utah is undisputedly the
state with the most significant relationship. 3

3

Utah applies the "most significant relationship" analysis of Section 188 of the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws when determining applicable law. See, e.g.,
One Beacon American Ins. Co. v. Hunstman Polymers Corp., 2012 UT App 100, ,J'if2728, 276 P.3d 1156. Under this analysis, factors to be considered include "the place of
contracting," "the place of negotiation of the contract," "the place of performance," "the
location of the subject matter of the contract," and the "place of incorporation and place
of business of the parties." Id. "If the place of negotiating the contract and the place of
performance are in the same state, the local law of this state will usually be applied."
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws§ 188(3); see also id. § 196. Here, both
Robinson and Solar are residents of the State of Utah, Solar's principal place of business
is in Utah, Solar provided Robinson with the Award Agreement in Utah, Utah is the place
of contracting where Robinson signed the Award Agreement and where all discussions
regarding the Award Agreement took place, the majority of Robinson's recruiting efforts
for Solar occurred in Utah, Robinson did not recruit (or attempt to recruit) anyone to
work for Solar in Delaware, and to Robinson's knowledge none of his recruits to Solar
resided or worked in Delaware. (R. 0002, 13 81.)
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2.

The district court correctly determined that S&A failed to
establish a basis permitting the use of blue pencil or
reformation principles to rewrite the Restrictive
Covenants.

S&A maintained from the filing of the Complaint that their Restrictive Covenants
were valid and fully enforceable. S&A switched tactics at summary judgment, tacitly
acknowledging for the first time that their Restrictive Covenants were facially invalid,
but arguing the district court could nevertheless render them enforceable through its
equitable powers of blue-penciling or reformation. The district court correctly declined
S&A's eleventh-hour invitation because (1) Utah has not adopted or sanctioned the use of
the blue-pencil doctrine, particularly in situations presented by the undisputed facts of
this case; (2) S&A failed to establish the necessary predicates for contract reformation
and failed to establish sufficient grounds permitting severance and reformation of their
admittedly unreasonable Restrictive Covenants; (3) the severability clauses in S&A's
respective agreements do not salvage the Restrictive Covenants; and (4) S&A's
reformation argument was unsupported by legal analysis and did not justify the relief
requested.
First, the district court correctly refused to blue pencil Solar's Restrictive
Covenants because no Utah appellate court has adopted or sanctioned the blue-pencil
doctrine. The district court's refusal to apply blue-pencil principles here was particularly
appropriate because "Utah law does not prescribe the use of a judicial blue pencil to
reform outrageously overbroad restrictive covenants ..." (R. 1438.) To the contrary, Utah
has a long-standing policy prohibiting courts from rewriting contracts. See, e.g., Zions
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Management Services v. Record, 2013 UT 36, 132, 305 P .3d 1062 (Utah courts will not
"allow the parties to change or rewrite their original agreement"); Perrenoud v. Harman,
2000 UT App 241, 113 n.3, 8 P.3d 293 (Utah courts "will not rewrite [a] contract on [the]
basis of equitable principles"); Genola Town v. Santaquin City, 110 P.2d 372, 373 (Utah
1941) ("The courts cannot rewrite a contract for the parties or enforce upon them one of
its own making.").
Specifically in the context of refusing a party's request to modify a non-compete
covenant, the United States District Court for the District of Utah applied these principles
and noted that the requested modification of a restrictive covenant "violate[ed] the wellestablished rule that a court will not rewrite the parties' contract." Systemic Formulas,

Inc. v. Kim, 2009 WL 4981631, *3 (D. Utah Dec. 14, 2009). The court in Systemic
Formulas cited RHN Corp. v. Veibell, 96 P.3d 935, 945 (Utah 2004), for the proposition
that "a court will not rewrite a contract to include terms that were not contemplated by
the parties," and Rio Algom Corp. v. Jimco Ltd., 618 P.2d 497, 505 (Utah 1980), for the
proposition that "' [a] court will not ... make a better contract for the parties than they
have made for themselves.'" Systemic Formulas, 2009 WL 4981631, *3.
Second, the district court properly refused to reform S&A's Restrictive Covenants
because they did not-and could not-establish the necessary foundational predicate to
support a reformation claim. On appeal, S&A argue that the district court "refused to
apply blue-pencil principles based on an incorrect conclusion that these principles cannot
be invoked without a claim for reformation." (Appl. Br., p. 21.) This argument
misconstrues the district court's ruling, which never stated that pleading a reformation
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claim was necessary to invoke the blue-pencil doctrine. Rather, the district court declined
to apply the blue-pencil doctrine because the claims were governed by Utah law, which
has not adopted or sanctioned the use of the blue-pencil doctrine. The district court
addressed Utah law on contract reformation specifically to address ARM's conclusory
assertion that the district court could simply reform ARM's unreasonable non-solicitation
provision. (R. 1119.)
Although ARM failed to expound on its conclusory assertion, the district court
nevertheless analyzed the reformation request and properly determined that its equitable
powers of reformation were "narrowly bounded" and did not grant it " ... carte blanche to
reform any transaction to include terms that it believes are fair." (R. 1427 (citing Briggs

v. Liddell, 699 P.2d 770, 772 (Utah 1985) (internal citations omitted)).) The district court
further explained that it could not reform the Restrictive Covenants because S&A did not
plead for such relief and never argued that their respective agreements failed to embody
the parties' intentions or were the product of a unilateral mistake. (Id.) In fact, S&A
alleged the opposite-that the Restrictive Covenants were valid and fully enforceable.
r2:l

\ll!W

Third, the district court also properly rejected S&A's claim that the severability
clauses in their respective agreements authorized the district court to reform the
Restrictive Covenants. Here again, S&A failed to preserve this argument because it was
not adequately raised below. Solar's entire severability argument below consisted of a
single conclusory sentence, and ARM' s severability argument was similarly sparse. (R.
1113, 1119.) Simply pointing to a severability provision and acknowledging a restrictive
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covenant's unreasonableness-without explanation or legal analysis-does not properly
preserve the argument for appeal. See Donjuan, 2011 UT 72, ,20.
And, in any event, the district court correctly rejected S&A' s severance argument.
Many courts, including the Utah Supreme Court, have rejected invitations to use a
contractual severability clause to salvage otherwise unenforceable provisions. In rejecting
this argument, one court stated:
[Plaintiff] argues that the court should implement this [severability] clause
to strike any sections of the . . . N oncompete that are unenforceable. The
court does not accept this argument. While a court applying Illinois law
may "make slight modifications to effectuate the intent of the parties . . .
the degree of unreasonableness of the original restraint" is a significant
factor in guiding the court's modification. Eichmann v. Nat'l Hospital and
Health Care Servs., Inc., 719 N.E.2d 1141, 1149 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
Where, as here, the restraint is patently "unfair because of its overbreadth,"
courts will refuse to modify the agreement, even in the presence of a
severability clause. Id. The court finds that the . . . Non compete is
sufficiently overbroad that any modifications would amount to the court
rewriting the agreement.

Hay Grp., Inc. v. Hassick, 2005 WL 2420415, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept._29, 2005) (emphasis
added). And in Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357, 363-64 (Utah 1996), the Utah Supreme
Court rejected a similar argument to the one advanced by S&A here. Given the
admittedly overbroad and onerous scope of the Restrictive Covenants, the district court
properly refused to save S&A from the consequences of their own drafting under the
guise of a contractual severance provision.
Even if the district court had applied the agreements' severability clauses, it would
not have altered the outcome of this case. The ARM agreement's severability provision
states in relevant part that "if any provision of this Agreement is held to be invalid, illegal
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or unenforceable in any respect under any applicable law or rule ... this Agreement shall
be reformed, construed and enforced in such jurisdiction as ifsuch invalid, illegal or
unenforceable provision had never been contained herein." (R. 0610.) Similarly, the
Solar LTIP Plan's severance provision states that if any invalid provision cannot be
construed or deemed amended to conform to an applicable jurisdiction's law, then "such
provision shall be construed or deemed stricken as to such jurisdiction, person or entity ..
." (R. 0527.) Because the district court correctly determined that S&A's Restrictive
Covenants could not be construed or deemed amended to be legally valid, it would have
been required to excise or strike the Restrictive Covenants entirely. See Simpson v. MSA
ofMyrtle Beach, Inc., 644 S.E.2d 663, 673-74 (S.C. 2007) (refusing to rely on a
contractual severability clause in an adhesion contract in light of the contract's multiple
unenforceable provisions). Contractual severance provisions do not permit the court to
rewrite the unenforceable provisions' terms or delete only certain portions of the
unenforceable provisions. So the end result of this lawsuit would have been the samesummary judgment in favor of Robinson.
Finally, S&A's argument that the district court's summary judgment ruling was
predicated on its determination that the Restrictive Covenants were substantively and
procedurally unconscionable is simply meritless. (Appl. Br., pp. 24-26.) The district court
granted summary judgment because S&A's Restrictive Covenants failed to satisfy the
necessary legal requirements established by the Utah Supreme Court-and admittedly so.
(R. 1425-27, 1436-38.) The district court looked to Utah law regarding unconscionable
contracts only to address S&A's conclusory assertion that their agreements' respective
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severance provisions permitted the district court to reform their unenforceable Restrictive
Covenants. (R. 1429-34.) But other than pointing to the severance provisions and
asserting that the district court could apply them here, S&A supplied the district court
with no legal analysis to support the assertion. The district court could have properly
rejected S&A's severance argument without any further analysis because "[m]erely
acknowledging a restrictive covenant's unreasonableness does not necessarily entitle one
to severance and enforcement of the remaining restrictive covenants." (R. 1429.)
The district court nevertheless proceeded to analyze S&A' s argument to see if it
might support the relief sought. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Sosa, 924
P .2d at 3 64, which addressed precisely the severance argument advanced by S&A, the
district court looked to the law regarding unconscionable contracts. (R. 1429-33.)
Analyzing the various unconscionability factors in light of the undisputed facts, the
district court correctly decided not to apply the severance provisions to reform the
outrageously overbroad Restrictive Covenants by severing only the unreasonable terms
because doing so would "reward bad behavior." (R. 1429-34.) Thus, the district court's
unconscionability analysis, and its ruling of substantive and procedural
unconscionability, were undertaken to explain why the district court declined S&A's
request to invoke its equitable powers to sever the unreasonable restrictions-not to
assert a supposedly unpreserved affirmative defense.
Moreover, the district court's unconscionability findings were correct and
supported by the undisputed facts and evidence presented during summary judgment.
With respect to substantive unconscionability, S&A simply make the bald conclusion that
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there was no evidence that Robinson was "oppressed" or "unfairly surprised" by their
agreements. (Appl. Br., p. 27.) S&A are wrong. The undisputed evidence showed that
S&A's restrictive covenants were one-sided and oppressive because even though
Robinson only worked selling residential alarms for less than two years, he was
supposedly restricted from working in solar, alarm, and numerous other industries
anywhere in the United States. He was also restricted for five years from engaging in a
host of unrelated activities, including marketing services to customers of S&A or their
affiliates (including Blackstone), or from soliciting any of their former employees to
work for a competing entity. (R. 1426-27.) These restrictive covenants were so overbroad
and oppressive that S&A never even attempted to justify them. The district court
therefore properly determined that the ARM restrictive covenants were not only
overbroad and unnecessary, they "shock the conscience and are substantively
unconscionable." (R. 1427.)
The district court also correctly determined that the agreements were obtained via
procedural unconscionability. (R. 1430-32.) S&A's claim that no evidence supported a
finding of procedural unconscionability because there was no discovery on the issue is
simply not true. S&A ignore the undisputed evidence cited by the district courtevidence showing that S&A's agreements consisted of boilerplate language drafted solely
by S&A; that the parties never negotiated, operated under, or even discussed these
agreements; that the agreements were never explained to Robinson; that Robinson was
not told he needed to execute them to continue his employment with ARM; that S&A
manifestly know how to draft reasonable restrictive covenants; and that the ARM
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agreements were interposed in a computer portal that required Robinson to click a button
accepting these agreements in order to perform his duties as a regional manager. (R.
1431-32.) These undisputed facts demonstrate that the district court's procedural
unconscionability analysis was correct.

C.

Even If Blue-Pencil Or Reformation Principles Were Available
Remedies, The District Court's Refusal To Award Them Was
Well Within Its Discretion.

Finally, the district court's summary judgment ruling should be affirmed because
blue-penciling and reformation are equitable remedies whose application resides soundly
within the discretion of the district court. See, e.g., Osguthorpe v. ASC Utah, Inc., 2015
UT 89, ifif37-38, 365 P.3d 1201; C & J Energy Services, Inc. v. City ofMiami General
Employees' and Sanitation Employees' Retirement Trust, 107 A.3d 1049, 1054 (Del.
2014); Pactiv Corp. v. Menasha Corp., 261 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1015-16 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
To prevail on appeal, S&A must therefore show that the blue-pencil doctrine or
reformation principles were legally available to salvage their Restrictive Covenants and
also that the district court's refusal to employ these equitable remedies was an abuse of
discretion. S&A failed to make either showing, and never even argued that the district
court's refusal to blue-pencil or reform their Restrictive Covenants was an abuse of
discretion.
Any attempt by S&A to demonstrate an abuse of discretion, however, would have
been futile. It is undisputed that when S&A fired Robinson two days before suing him,
they presented him with a termination letter asserting that he was subject to "continuing
obligations, including without limitation any non-competition, non-solicitation or
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confidentiality covenants," that Robinson's agreements "remain in effect in accordance

with their respective provisions," that S&A were "fully prepared to defend their rights if
[Robinson] cho[]se to breach any of these agreements," and that S&A would take "any
and all action necessary" if they "suspect[ed] any breach of these obligations." (R. 060203) (emphases added).) Forty-eight hours later, S&A made good on their threats and sued
Robinson. (R. 0001-19.)
In their Complaint, S&A sought a declaration that all of their Restrictive
Covenants "were and are valid and fully enforceable." (R. 0013 (emphasis added).)
They also sought a judgment that Robinson breached the Restrictive Covenants by
"engaging in competition with [S&A] in violation of the Non-Competition Covenants in
the L TIP Agreement ... [and] by directly or indirectly soliciting or recruiting employees
of [S&A] to terminate their employment or business relationship with [S&A] and work
for Sunrun or another person or entity in competition with [S&AJ in violation of the
Non-Solicitation Covenants in the Agreements." (R. 0016 (emphasis added).) Nowhere

in their termination letter or Complaint did S&A ever suggest that they sought only
narrow or limited enforcement of only some of the Restrictive Covenants' terms. Nor did
they ever allege that all they wanted was for the court to sever, reform, or blue-pencil the
unreasonable Restrictive Covenants.
And although S&A finally conceded at summary judgment that their Restrictive
Covenants were impermissibly overbroad and unenforceable, the undisputed evidence
showed that S&A knew this indisputable fact all along because they know how to draft
reasonable restrictive covenants because they did so when contracting with each other

35 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and with their high-level executives. (R. 0660-79, 0698-0706.) When S&A drafted
restrictive covenants for these contracts, they omitted restrictions barring competition
anywhere in the United States in various unrelated industries and axed restrictions
prohibiting the solicitation of any former employee of a myriad of unidentified entities.
Qi

S&A instead drafted much more narrow covenants that restricted former executives from
performing tasks only for an actual competitor and only if those tasks were similar to
those the executive provided for the company. And even then, the restrictions applied
only within the specific geographic location where the executive actually worked or had
supervisory responsibility. (R. 0662-65.)
Based on these undisputed facts, the district court acted well within its discretion
when it declined S&A's request to employ its equitable powers to reform, blue-pencil, or
sever the unreasonable Restrictive Covenant terms. As the district court accurately
recognized, employing its equitable powers to protect S&A from the consequences of
their own overreaching "would reward bad behavior" and "would only encourage
overreaching." (R. 1433, 1438.) Indeed, if the district court had accepted S&A's
invitation and relieved them from the consequences of their own drafting, it would have
incentivized S&A to continue drafting overbroad restrictive covenants knowing that at
worst a court would reform them to render them reasonable.
Many courts-including Delaware courts-have reached the same conclusion the
district court reached here, warning against the pernicious effects of reforming overbroad
restrictive covenants. "[A] court should not allow an employer to back away from an
overbroad covenant by proposing to enforce it to a lesser extent than written. More
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importantly, a court should not save a facially invalid provision by rewriting it and
~

enforcing only what the court deems reasonable." Delaware Elevator, Inc. v. Williams,
2011 WL 1005181, *10 (Del. Ct. Ch. Mar. 16, 2011 ). As the Delaware Elevator court
recognized, "[d]oing so puts the employer in a no-lose position. If an employer knows
that the court will enforce a reasonable covenant as a fallback, the employer has every
reason to start with an overbroad provision." Id.
Another court recognized that the policies underlying the "refusal to blue-pencil
over-broad employment contracts apply equally to employers' attempts to do so on their
own" because otherwise employers "could load up non-competition agreements with
oppressively overreaching terms and intimidate all but the litigation-hardy employees,
then post-hoc excise offending provisions to avoid requested judicial invalidation."
Palmer & Cay, Inc. v. Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc., 404 F.3d 1297, 1307 (11th
Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). That is exactly what S&A
attempted to accomplish with this lawsuit-pursue overbroad restrictive covenants
against Robinson through nearly two years of costly and burdensome litigation and then,
after discovery closes and in the face of invalidation on summary judgment, back away
from the terms they were solely responsible for drafting to seek narrower enforcement.
The district court's refusal to allow S&A to get away with their scheme was the correct
decision-and certainly well within its discretion.

~
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II.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES TO
ROBINSON UNDER THE BAD FAITH ATTORNEY FEE STATUTE.
Utah's bad faith attorney fee statute mandates payment of the prevailing party's

reasonable attorney fees if the action was (1) without merit, and (2) brought or asserted in
bad faith. Utah Code §78B-5-825(1); see also Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151-52
(Utah 1983) (recognizing that "bad faith" is synonymous with '"lack of good faith"' for
purposes of bad faith attorney fee statute). In reviewing a district court's application of
this statute, the Court applies different standards of review to the two requirements: the
without merit requirement presents a question of law that is reviewed for correctness, and
the bad faith requirement presents a question of fact that is reviewed under the deferential
clearly erroneous standard. In re Sonnenreich, 2004 UT 3, if45, 86 P.3d 712. Here, S&A
have failed to carry their burden at both stages.

A.

S&A's Action Against Robinson Was Without Merit.

The district court correctly determined that S&A' s action against Robinson was
without merit. "Claims without merit are those which are 'frivolous' or 'of little weight
or importance having no basis in law or fact."' Warner v. DMG Color, Inc., 2000 UT
102, ,r22, 20 P.3d 868 (quoting Cady, 671 P.2d at 151). The sole basis for S&A's action
against Robinson was the alleged enforceability of the Restrictive Covenants. S&A's
Complaint alleged that the Restrictive Covenants were "valid and fully enforceable"
against Robinson and were "reasonably necessary to protect important assets of ARM
and Solar, including goodwill and confidential information." (R. 0012-14.) Nowhere in
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their Complaint or during nearly two years of litigation did S&A ever suggest that they
were seeking only limited enforcement of the Restrictive Covenants.
Despite bringing this action and seeking a judgment declaring its Restrictive
Covenants valid and fully enforceable against Robinson, S&A conceded at summary
judgment that their Restrictive Covenants were not valid or fully enforceable because
they were impermissibly overbroad and imposed restraints far greater than necessary.
S&A' s confession leaves no doubt that their claims were without merit because they were
frivolous or of little weight or importance having no factual or legal basis.
S&A argue that they had a basis in law and fact to bring this action because
Robinson entered into the agreements containing the restrictive covenants and their
claims are based on what S&A assert is a reasonable interpretation of those covenants.
But the merit of S&A's claims is not evaluated in a vacuum devoid of the context in
which those claims are brought. "[T]he bare existence of a basis in law for a potential
claim is not sufficient to make a claim meritorious. Rather, there must also be a factual
basis for a party's claims apart from a statutory provision that provides a theoretical basis
in law for those claims." Breese v. Barton, 2016 UT App 220, ,I49, 387 P.3d 536 (internal
quotation omitted). It is insufficient for S&A merely to point to the contract language. If
the mere existence of contractual language were sufficient to render a claim meritorious,
fj

the bad faith statute would have virtually no application in contract disputes. As S&A
knew when they sued Robinson, restrictive covenants are not blindly enforced-they are
evaluated according to their terms and are only "enforceable if carefully drawn to protect
(ii,

only the legitimate interests of the employer." Robbins, 645 P.2d at 627.
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S&A argue that so-called blue pencil principles have a basis in law and therefore
their claims had merit in seeking what they characterize as narrow injunctive relief. But
S&A did not bring this action seeking enforcement of some watered-down, blue-penciled
version of their restrictive covenants as they now claim-they sought full enforcement
and maintained that position though nearly two years of litigation. And Utah law is well
settled that courts will not employ equitable principles to reform a contract to make a
better or different agreement than the one the parties made for themselves. See Rio Algom

Corp., 618 P.2d at 505; Perrenoud, 2000 UT App 241, ifl3 n.3. No Utah court has ever
endorsed the application of "blue pencil principles" or vague notions of "reformation" to
enforce facially unenforceable post-employment restrictive covenants and this area of the
law is not, as S&A claim, unsettled.
Contrary to S&A's assertion, the district court's statement that Solar provided at
least some basis for its argument on summary judgment that the restrictive covenants
could be blue-penciled to a narrower scope does not demonstrate that their action had
merit. S&A' s position when they first brought this action against Robinson was that their
restrictive covenants were governed by Utah law and should be declared valid and fully
enforceable. (R. 0002, 0013.) That is the action S&A brought against Robinson. Then,
facing summary judgment in light of their untenable claims under Utah law, S&A
attempted to re-characterize this action as seeking enforcement of judicially narrowed
restrictive covenants under Delaware law. The fact that S&A were able, nearly two years
after filing their Complaint, to formulate an argument on summary judgment that the
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district court concluded was not entirely frivolous does not imbue this action with merit
that was wholly lacking from the outset.

B.

The District Court Did Not Clearly Err In Finding That S&A's
Claims Were Brought And Asserted In Bad Faith.

The district court's finding that S&A brought and asserted their claims in bad faith
was not clearly erroneous and should not be disturbed on appeal. As a threshold matter,
S&A has not carried their burden of marshaling the evidence and demonstrating that it
was legally insufficient to support the district court's finding. And the record evidence
amply supports the finding of bad faith below under each of the three factors established
in Cady, 671 P.2d at 151.

1.

S&A have not carried their burden of marshaling the
evidence supporting the district court's finding of bad
faith.

As appellants, S&A face an uphill battle in challenging the district court's factual
finding that they acted in bad faith. Whether a claim has been brought and asserted in bad
faith "is a question of fact and [this Court] review[s] it under a clearly erroneous
standard." In re Sonnenreich, 2004 UT 3, ,I45. This deferential standard of review
requires S&A to "show that the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the [district]
court, is legally insufficient to support the contested finding." Id. ,I45 n.14 (alteration in
original; internal quotation omitted). To prevail on their challenge to the district court's
finding of bad faith, S&A "must first marshal all record evidence that supports the
challenged finding." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). This marshaling requirement is critical to
S&A's appeal because "a party who fails to identify and deal with supportive evidence
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will never persuade an appellate court to reverse under the deferential standard of review
that applies to such issues." State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, 'iJ40, 326 P.3d 645.
Rather than marshal the evidence supporting the district court's finding of bad
faith, S&A simply ignore that evidence. S&A repeatedly argue that the district court
relied on only one line of their Complaint-the requested declaratory relief that S&A' s
restrictive covenants "were and are valid and fully enforceable" (R. 0013)-as evidence
of their bad faith. S&A are wrong. As discussed in detail below in Part II.B .2, the district
court carefully identified undisputed facts relating to S&A' s conduct in this litigation on
which it relied in analyzing each of the three Cady factors showing S&A's bad faith.
A common thread running through the district court's bad faith analysis was
S&A's continued assertion that the Restrictive Covenants were valid and fully
enforceable against Robinson even though S&A themselves were wholly unable to
articulate a defense or justification for those covenants as drafted. (R. 1885-88.) The
district court's focus on the evidence of S&A's conduct in this litigation was entirely
proper because the bad faith statute speaks in terms of a party bringing or asserting "the
action" in good faith. Utah Code §78B-5-825(1 ). The district court correctly inferred that
S&A were not motivated to bring this action by the merits of their claims but instead by
their bad faith intent to use the burden of this litigation against Robinson.
Because parties rarely-if ever-candidly admit their nefarious intent, district
courts may "make findings based on circumstantial evidence." Gilbert v. Utah State Bar,
2016 UT 32, 'if44, 379 P.3d 1247. "[C]ircumstantial evidence is particularly useful in
establishing intent because direct evidence of intent is rarely available ... " Id. (internal
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quotation omitted) (second alteration in original). Courts are permitted to rely on
circumstantial evidence "to find intent on the basis of reasonable inferences drawn from
the evidence." Id (internal quotation omitted). S&A did not marshal the evidence
supporting the district court's findings-they ignored it-so they cannot successfully
challenge the district court's findings on appeal.

2.

The evidence before the district court amply supported its
finding of bad faith as to each of the Cady factors.

The evidence amply supported the district court's factual finding that S&A
brought and asserted this action in bad faith. To establish bad faith, a party must show
only one of the following factors: (1) the plaintiff lacked "[a]n honest belief in the
propriety of the activities in question"; (2) the plaintiff intended "to take unconscionable
advantage of others"; or (3) the plaintiff had "intent to, or knowledge of the fact that the
activities in question will, hinder, delay or defraud others." Cady, 671 P.2d at 151
(internal quotation omitted). The district court carefully analyzed S&A's conduct in this
litigation under each factor, found that each was present, and carefully detailed the
evidence supporting its findings. (R. 1885-88.)
S&A challenge the district court's analysis of each Cady factor. Before doing so,
however, S&A claim that the district court contradicted itself in finding bad faith. In
support of this claim, S&A point to a single quotation from the final page of the district
court's Order Awarding Attorney Fees. (Appellants' Brief, p. 38.) But S&A misquote the
district court's actual language. The district court stated that it was "not convinced that
Solar's argument on this issue was necessarily made in bad faith." (R. 1889 (emphasis
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added).) S&A's brief omits the emphasized portion of the court's statement and takes the
quotation out of context. When the complete statement is read in context, it is readily
apparent that there is no contradiction. The immediately preceding sentence of the Order
Awarding Attorney Fees is clear that the "issue" was Solar' s argument on summary
judgment that its restrictive covenants could be blue-penciled if Delaware law applied.
(R. 1888-89.) Nothing in the district court's actual statement suggests that it was not
convinced that S&A brought and asserted "the action" against Robinson in bad faith. See
Utah Code §78B-5-825(1). Indeed, the district court made clear that "if this case does not
justify an award of attorneys' fees under Utah Code §78B-5-825(1 ), it would be difficult
for the Court to think of a case that would trigger the statute." (R. 1888.)
S&A then challenge the district court's findings that each of the three Cady factors
demonstrates their bad faith, but their arguments do not show clear error.

a.

The district court did not clearly err in finding that S&A
lacked an honest belief in the propriety of their claims.

The district court found that when S&A brought this action they lacked an honest
belief in the propriety of their claims against Robinson. This finding was not clearly
erroneous. S&A argue that the district court reached this conclusion based solely on an
inference it drew from the relief requested in their Complaint that the court declare the
restrictive covenants "valid and fully enforceable" against Robinson. (R. 0013.) But that
allegation was only one of a number of facts on which the district court relied. The
district court also found that S&A ( 1) sought declaratory relief that the restrictive
covenants were valid and fully enforceable, (2) never attempted to demonstrate the
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reasonableness or legality of the covenants they claimed were fully enforceable, and (3)
abandoned their efforts to fully enforce the Restrictive Covenants, silently conceding they
were invalid. (R. 1885-86.) These factual predicates-which relate specifically to S&A's
conduct in this action-support the district court's conclusion.
S&A argue the district court improperly conflated the "without merit" analysis
with the "bad faith" analysis. It did not. The district court recognized that S&A were
unable-at any point in the litigation, including when faced with summary judgment-to
articulate a basis for the relief sought that their restrictive covenants were valid and fully
enforceable. This shows that S&A did not have an honest belief that they were entitled to
the relief they sought at the outset of the case. 4 This Court has recognized that the
inability to articulate a basis for the relief requested in a complaint is properly used to
show bad faith. In Blum v. Dahl, 2012 UT App 198, ,I12, 283 P.3d 963, the Court
affirmed the district court's award of attorney fees under the bad faith statute, stating that
the plaintiff's inability to provide a basis for her claimed damages indicated the lack of an
honest belief in the claims asserted. The same is true here, where S&A have consistently
been unable to articulate a basis for their requested declaratory judgment that the
restrictive covenants were "valid and fully enforceable."

4

S&A cite the federal district court's opinion in Bad Ass Coffee Co. ofHawaii, Inc. v.
JH Nterprises, L.L.C., 636 F. Supp. 2d 1237 (D. Utah 2009), in support of the proposition
that a court should not unreasonably construe restrictive covenants. Of course, that case is
not controlling in this Court. And, in any event, Bad Ass Coffee does not help S&A here
because even they could not offer a reasonable construction of the restrictive covenants
that they drafted and foisted on Robinson. It was not the district court below that read
S&A' s restrictive covenants in a manner that rendered them indefensibly broad-S&A
did that on their own.
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S&A also argue that the district court ignored the difference between "a general
Complaint allegation for enforceability" and "the specific claim for relief that limits
enforcement." (Appellants' Brief, pp. 40-41.) This is a red herring. That S&A sought
ostensibly narrower relief in one portion of their Complaint does not limit the scope of
relief sought in the Complaint's other claims. And, in any event, the allegation in S&A's
Complaint regarding the full enforceability of their Restrictive Covenants was contained
in a specific claim for relief-the First Claim for Relief-and was incorporated by

~

reference into each subsequent claim. (R. 0013, 0017.)
Finally, S&A argue that no evidence establishes that they knew the district court
would not fully enforce their restrictive covenants. This argument is unavailing in two
significant respects. First, as noted above, the district court properly relied on
circumstantial evidence to infer S&A' s lack of an honest belief in the propriety of their
claims-it was not necessary for S&A to directly admit their bad faith motivation. See

Gilbert, 2016 UT 32, if44, 379 P.3d 1247. Second, Cady does not require a litigant to

know it will not obtain the requested relief-it only requires that the litigant lack an
honest belief in the propriety of its claims. There was ample evidence below to support
the finding that S&A lacked an honest belief in the propriety of their claims-including
abandoning any attempt to justify or defend the validity of their Restrictive Covenants as
drafted.
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b.

The district court did not clearly err in finding that S&A
intended to take unconscionable advantage of
Robinson.

The district court's finding that S&A intended to take unconscionable advantage
of Robinson by filing this action was not clearly erroneous. S&A again argue that the
district court reached this conclusion by relying on the same "valid and fully enforceable"
claim in the Complaint. (R. 0013.) But again, the district court cited a number of
supporting facts, including that Robinson never was employed by Solar, that Robinson
never sold any of Solar's products, and that Robinson never interacted with any of
Solar's customers. (R. 1886.) Despite these undisputed facts, S&A nevertheless sought in
their Complaint to prevent Robinson from working in the solar industry-and in other
industries-throughout the entire country. (Id) The district court recognized that S&A's
Complaint was not limited specifically to Robinson's relationship with SunRun and that
nothing in S&A' s conduct suggested they would not have sought to freeze Robinson out
of other businesses as well. (Id.) S&A simply ignore these undisputed facts.
S&A again argue that the district court conflated the "without merit" analysis with
the "bad faith" analysis and again point to the scope of the injunction sought to argue that
they were not seeking to take unconscionable advantage of Robinson. These arguments
are as unavailing in the "unconscionable advantage" analysis as they were in the "lack of
(i)

honest belief'' analysis above. As before, the scope of relief requested in S&A's Fourth
Claim for Relief (seeking an injunction) does not limit the scope of relief sought in their
First Claim for Relief (seeking a declaratory judgment). And the fact that S&A sought
both a declaration that the restrictive covenants were fully enforceable and an injunction
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against Robinson working in the solar industry with SunRun despite having never worked
(j

for Solar shows that S&A intended to take unconscionable advantage of Robinson by
freezing him out of whatever business he pursued.
S&A could not articulate a legitimate business interest justifying the full
enforcement of their restrictive covenants against Robinson as is legally required for such
restrictions to be valid and enforceable. Indeed, S&A could not even identify all of the
industries or companies covered by their restrictive covenants. (R. 0543-48.) And as the
district court correctly observed, there is nothing in S&A's conduct or their Complaint
suggesting that they brought this action seeking anything other than full enforcement
against Robinson. In seeking to have the restrictive covenants declared valid and fully
enforceable, S&A demonstrated their intent to enforce the restrictions against Robinson
regardless of where he went to work and regardless of any legitimate interest they may
have had in such enforcement. There is no other reason for requesting such relief.
The district court did not, as S&A suggest, assume that restrictive covenants can
only apply to employees who make customer sales, nor did it ignore that Robinson
voluntarily signed the Award Agreement. The district court did, however, recognize the
undisputed facts that Robinson never worked for Solar and never interacted with Solar's
customers (R. 0392, 1622, 1886), so there were no customer relationships that Solar
needed to protect by barring Robinson from the solar industry. And because Solar
operates in only the residential solar industry, there was absolutely no basis to prevent
Robinson from working in the host of other industries encompassed by the restrictive
covenants. Yet that is exactly what S&A sought to do when they brought this action,
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thereby demonstrating their intent to take unconscionable advantage of Robinson by
preventing him from pursuing work opportunities without a legitimate interest in doing
so.
C.

The district court did not clearly err in finding that S&A
intended and knew the filing of this action would
improperly hinder and delay Robinson.

The district court did not clearly err in finding that S&A acted with the intent and
knowledge that bringing this action would improperly hinder and delay Robinson from
engaging in business. In making this finding, the district court relied on several pieces of
undisputed evidence of S&A's conduct. Specifically, the district court relied on the vast
overbreadth of S&A' s restrictive covenants and the overbreadth of their Complaint

combined with their lack of candor in the litigation about the scope of relief being sought
as evidence that S&A intended to improperly hinder and delay Robinson from pursuing
his lawful employment. (R. 1887.) The district court also found that while S&A tacitly
conceded their Restrictive Covenants were facially invalid, the evidence demonstrated
that they knew how to draft reasonable restrictive covenants. (Id.)
S&A' s argument that they sought only limited relief in the form of an injunction
against Robinson working with SunRun is particularly pernicious because although it is
indisputable that S&A demanded a judgment declaring the Restrictive Covenants valid
(fl)

and fully enforceable, they can point to no portion of the record below in which they
articulated a basis on which their Restrictive Covenants could be considered valid or fully
enforceable. And S&A do not take such a position on appeal. So the relief S&A sought
included both a declaratory judgment that the Restrictive Covenants are fully enforceable
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and an injunction against Robinson working with SunRun. There is nothing that would
have prevented S&A from subsequently seeking an injunction against Robinson from
working for a different company or in a different industry if S&A believed he were doing
so. And if S&A obtained the requested declaratory judgment, they would be wellequipped to do just that-follow Robinson from job to job, obtaining injunction after
injunction prohibiting him from pursuing employment opportunities without a legitimate
interest in doing so. The district court recognized this exact tactic, noting that "there is no
indication from the Complaint that [S&A] were asking the Court to uphold only certain
portions of the restrictive covenants." (R. 1887.) Courts have repeatedly rejected this
approach to restrictive covenants, in which an employer imposes manifestly overbroad
restrictive covenants on employees and then seeks enforcement based on the work a
former employee actually pursues. See supra Part LC and cases cited therein.
S&A claim that their conduct does not show bad faith because it is not the type of
conduct other courts have found to constitute bad faith, such as bringing an action
without any reasonable basis in fact to support the claims. But that is precisely what S&A
have done: asserted claims seeking full enforcement of the Restrictive Covenants without
any reasonable basis in fact or law under which their Restrictive Covenants could be
considered valid and fully enforceable. Simply put, S&A had no factual or legal basis to
support this claim, but they pursued it anyway.
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Ill.

ROBINSON IS ENTITLED TO HIS ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
INCURRED ON APPEAL.
Robinson requests that this Court award him the attorney fees and costs he has

incurred in connection with this appeal. "' [W]hen a party who received attorney fees
below prevails on appeal, the party is also entitled to fees reasonably incurred on
appeal."' Austin v. Bingham, 2014 UT App 15,133, 319 P.3d 738 (quoting Valcarce v.
Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 319 (Utah 1998)) (alteration in original). "This is true even

when the basis for attorney fees in the trial court is the bad faith statute." Id. ( collecting
cases). Because this Court should affirm the district court's rulings in their entirety,
Robinson should also be awarded his reasonable attorney fees incurred on appeal.
Robinson also requests an award of his costs incurred on appeal pursuant to Utah
R. App. P. 34.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the district court's rulings in
their entirety.
DATED this 27th day of September 2017.
MITCHELL BARLOW & MANSFIELD, P.C.

Isl J. Ryan Mitchell
J. Ryan Mitchell
Andrew V. Collins
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee Douglas
Robinson
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